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ABSTRACT
We present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an
arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining
models, the status quo is not assumed to be bad for all legislators, and delay may
be Pareto efﬁcient. We prove existence of stationary equilibria. We show that if all
legislators are risk averse or if even limited transfers are possible, then delay is only
possible if the status quo lies in the core. Thus, we expect immediate agreement
in multidimensional models, where the core is typically empty. In one dimension,
delay is possible if and only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule,
and then it is the only possible outcome. Our comparative statics analysis yield two
noteworthy insights: moderate status quos imply moderate policy outcomes, and
legislative patience implies policy moderation.
A central objective of research in political economy is to obtain a general under-
standing of the determinants of public policy in a majoritarian society. Black’s (1958)
median voter theorem provides compelling predictions when policies are restricted to
a single dimension, but the theory of social choice has yielded quite negative results
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on the existence of majority rule equilibria in multiple dimensions.1 A tool of potential
importance in surmounting this obstacle is the non-cooperative theory of bargaining,
deriving from the work of Rubinstein (1982). The theory has found numerous appli-
cations, including distributive politics (Baron and Ferejohn 1989), government forma-
tion (Merlo 1997; Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo 2002), international relations (Powell
2002), and bankruptcy (Eraslan 2002a). Applications to policy-making in a legislative
body, however, are few in number and limited by the implicit assumption, ubiquitous in
the game-theoretic literature on bargaining, that failure to reach an agreement is worse
for all legislators than every possible bargaining outcome.
This assumption of a bad status quo can be traced to Rubinstein’s (1982) model,
where two people must agree on a division of a resource and take turns making offers and
responding to offers. In the simplest version of this model, a legislator’s payoff is just the
share of resource consumed, and therefore the payoff in any period an agreement is not
reached is simply zero: the status quo in thismodel is no consumption, which is obviously
worse for the legislators than any division the two might decide on. Binmore (1987)
elaborates on the basic framework by allowing the proposer to be randomly selected in
each period. In a seminal paper, Baron and Ferejohn (1989) apply this approach to model
legislative allocation of pork barrel goods, assuming any ﬁnite number of legislators and
voting by majority rule: in their closed-rule model, a legislator is randomly selected to
propose an allocation of spending across districts; if this proposal is passed by a majority
of the legislature, then the game ends with that allocation; otherwise, the game continues
to the next period, where this process is repeated. Legislators do not enjoy the beneﬁts of
pork until it is allocated and so, as in the basic model, the status quo is zero. The theory
of bargaining in distributive settings is now well developed,2 but the application to pork
barrel spending misses the public good aspect of public policy and the fact that “more”
is not always preferred to “less.”
The ﬁrst application to public policy is due to Baron (1991), who considers examples of
policy-making in a two-dimensional issue space, assuming three and four legislators and
quadratic utilities.Thus, each legislator has circular indifference curves centered around
a unique ideal point in the policy space. Legislators are assumed to be perfectly patient,
however, so that delay is costless and considerations of the status quo are moot. Jackson
and Moselle (2002) assume a unidimensional policy space in addition to a divisible
resource, and Banks and Duggan (2000) generalize the above models by simply allowing
any convex set of policies and concave utilities. There, we prove existence of stationary
equilibria in multidimensional issue spaces and, for the case of one dimension, we show
that the equilibrium outcomes of bargaining converge to the ideal point of the median
voter as the legislators place greaterweight on the future.Thesemodels of policy-making,
1 See Plott (1967), Rubinstein (1979), Schoﬁeld (1983), Cox (1984), Le Breton (1987), McKelvey and
Schoﬁeld (1987), Banks (1995), and Saari (1997).
2 Theoretical analyses building on this work have studied risk aversion (Harrington 1989, 1990a,
1990b), externalities in consumption (Calvert and Dietz 2005), veto rules (Winter 1996, McCarty
2000), a stochastic resource constraint (Merlo and Wilson 1995, Eraslan and Merlo 2002), and
uniqueness of stationary equilibria (Eraslan 2002b, Cho and Duggan 2003).
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except for Baron (1991) who imposes perfect patience, follow the above-cited papers in
assuming a bad status quo. But while that assumption may be reasonable in the context
of distributing pork, it is less desirable in a bargaining model of policy-making,where it is
likely that at least some legislators are happy with the status quo – and it is very unlikely
that every legislator prefers every policy to the status quo.
In this paper we model the status quo as an arbitrary, perhaps Pareto-efﬁcient, policy.
We follow Banks and Duggan (2000) by allowing for a general multidimensional issue
space and general utility functions on the part of legislators. We assume the proposer in
any period is randomly selected, as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), but we allow for an
arbitrary voting rule. We capture unanimity rule, majority rule, and veto rules as special
cases, andwe even allow the legislators to bepartitioned into twohouses, amajority in each
required for passage. Our model generates insights into some well-known special cases,
including Romer and Rosenthal’s (1978a,1978b) agenda-setting model, in which a ﬁxed
proposer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer subject to a majority vote, as well as Krehbiel’s
(1996, 1998) model of a unicameral legislature with a ﬁlibuster rule and executive veto.
We capture these one-shot models by assuming impatient legislators (setting discount
factors equal to zero) and a single issue dimension, but our general framework allows
us to investigate the effects of adding an inﬁnite-horizon (positive discount factors) and
more issue dimensions. Similarly, imbedding the model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989)
in our framework, we can consider the effects of changing the status quo from zero to,
for example, equal division. We show, for example, that adding an inﬁnite horizon to
the Romer–Rosenthal or Krehbiel models does not affect their results when utilities are
quadratic, while a positive status quo in the Baron–Ferejohn model reduces the rents of
the proposer.
Our ﬁrst general result is that, despite the fact that some legislatorsmay favor the status
quo, there always exists a stationary equilibrium in which every proposal made passes,
i.e., there exists a no-delay stationary equilibrium. Furthermore, we prove that the no-
delay stationary equilibriumproposals are upper hemicontinuous in the parameters of the
model: small perturbations of the parameters cannot produce equilibria far from those
at the original speciﬁcation. This is illustrated in Romer and Rosenthal’s (1978a,1978b)
agenda-setting model, where the setter’s proposal varies continuously with voter ideal
points and the status quo. An implication is that, if we give voters a small amount of
patience and give the agenda setter a proposal probability slightly less than one, then
equilibrium outcomes will be close to Romer and Rosenthal’s solution. And if we imbed
their model in a multidimensional space and ideal points are close to collinear, then
equilibrium outcomes will again be close to the original ones. Similar observations also
hold for Krehbiel’s (1996, 1998) legislative model. Finally, if we modify the Baron and
Ferejohn (1989) model to allow for a status quo with slightly positive consumptions
of the resource, or if we give the legislators a small amount of risk aversion, then the
equilibrium outcomes will be close to theirs.
An advantage of our approach to modeling the status quo is that we can now more
meaningfully consider the possibility of delay in bargaining, which, among the above-
mentioned models, was possible only with some probability of a relaxed resource
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constraint in the future (Merlo and Wilson 1995, Eraslan and Merlo 2002).3 We show
that delay is possible in our model, but only under very speciﬁc circumstances. If all
legislators are risk averse or if even limited transfers are possible, then delay is only
possible if the status quo lies in the core, and in that case the only possible outcome once
a decision is made is the status quo itself. Since the core, the set of policies undominated
according to the voting rule, is almost always empty when the policy space is multidimen-
sional, we conclude that there will typically be immediate agreement in multidimensional
settings.
Our results are sharpest for unidimensional policy spaces. We show that when the
status quo is in the core, the equilibrium outcome is the status quo every period. We
refer to this phenomenon as “core selection,” which is related to the notion of core
equivalence in Banks and Duggan (2000). In contrast to the core equivalence results in
that paper, which assume very patient legislators, here we make no assumption about the
rate of time discounting by legislators. When voting is by majority rule, of course, it is
known that the core consists of the median policies, and our core selection result yields a
new game-theoretic perspective on Black’s (1958) median voter theorem: whereas Black
arrives at the median from a social choice theory approach, we give conditions under
which strategic, forward-looking legislators arrive at the same outcome. We also show
that, if the status quo is not in the core, then it is never proposed.Thus, occurrence of the
status quo in equilibrium is all or nothing, i.e., it is always proposed by every legislator
(if it is in the core) or never proposed by any legislator (if it is outside the core).
Finally, we present comparative static results on the patience of legislators and on
the location of the status quo for the unidimensional model. First, as a corollary of our
core selection and continuity results, if the status quo is close to the core, then the sta-
tionary equilibrium proposals of the legislators will also be close to the core. In other
words, moderate status quos imply moderate policy outcomes. Second, if the legislators are
sufﬁciently patient, then, regardless of the location of the status quo, all equilibrium
proposals will be arbitrarily close to the core. That is, legislative patience implies policy
moderation. The latter comparative static delivers an asymptotic version of the median
voter theorem, one that is independent of the location of the status quo. It also suggests
the following for the design of electoral institutions, which are unmodeled here: if we
view the discount factor of a legislator as corresponding to the probability of reelec-
tion, then systems that offer a sufﬁcient incumbency advantage will lead to moderate
policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model
and formal deﬁnition of our equilibrium concept. In Section 3, we present a number
of special cases, including the Romer and Rosenthal (1978a,b) agenda-setting model,
Krehbiel’s (1996, 1998) legislative bargaining model, and a generalization of the Baron
and Ferejohn (1989) bargaining model with an arbitrary status quo. In Section 4, we
present our results on equilibriumexistence, stability of the status quo, and core selection.
In Section 5, we conclude.AnAppendix contains proofs of theorems and other technical
considerations.
3 Delay may also be obtained by adding incomplete information to the model, as in Rubinstein (1985).
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THE LEGISLATIVE BARGAINING MODEL
Let X ⊆ d denote a nonempty, compact, convex set of policies with at least two policy
alternatives, and let q ∈ X denote the status quo policy. Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote a set
of legislators, with n ≥ 2, who play an inﬁnite-horizon bargaining game over the set of
policies. The timing of interaction is as follows. If no policy has been accepted prior to
period t , then (1) legislator i is recognized with probability ρi ≥ 0, where∑i∈N ρi = 1;
then (2) the selected legislator i makes a proposal pi ∈ X; then (3) every legislator j ∈ N
simultaneously votes to either accept or reject the proposal. The recognition probabilities,
ρ1, . . . , ρn, are exogenously ﬁxed throughout the game. Let D ⊆ 2N \ {∅} denote a
collection of decisive coalitions, also exogenously ﬁxed.4 If the group of legislators voting
for the proposal is decisive, i.e., {j ∈ N | j accepts } ∈ D, then the proposal pi is the
chosen policy and bargaining ends with outcome pi in period t and in every subsequent
period. Otherwise, the outcome in period t is q, and steps 1–3 are repeated for period
t + 1.
We impose on the voting rule D only the minimal conditions that it is nonempty and
monotonic, in the sense that any superset of a decisive coalition is itself decisive: C ∈ D
and C ⊆ C ′ imply C ′ ∈ D. Thus, we allow for a variety of voting rules beyond majority
rule (D = {C ⊆ N | |C| > n/2}), such as unanimity rule (D = {N}), and dictatorship
(D = {C ⊆ N | i ∈ C} for some i ∈ N ). For another example, a proposal may require
a majority of legislators other than a designated legislator, say n, to pass, i.e.,
DRR =
{
C ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣ |C \ {n}| > n − 12
}
.
Letting ρn = 1, we have the set-up of the agenda-setting model of Romer and Rosenthal
(1978a, 1978b), where legislator n plays the role of agenda setter. Or we can capture a
unicameral legislature and executive with a ﬁlibuster rule (3/5 cloture rule) and executive
veto (2/3 override rule) as follows. Letting n denote the executive and N \ {n} the
legislature, deﬁne
DK =
{
C ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣ |C \ {n}| ≥ 2(n − 1)3 or both n ∈ C
and |C \ {n}| ≥ 3(n − 1)
5
}
,
That is, a coalition is decisive if it contains two thirds of the legislature or three ﬁfths
plus the executive. Letting m denote the median legislator and ρm = 1, we have the
set-up of the legislative model of Krehbiel (1996, 1998). Some of our results do use the
assumption that D is proper, i.e., if C ∈ D, then N \ C /∈ D. This is clearly a weak
condition: when D is used to deﬁne strict social preferences, as in the theory of social
choice, it is always satisﬁed.
4 In the terminology of cooperative game theory, D describes a “simple game,” and the elements of
D are “winning coalitions.”
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Each legislator i’s preferences over sequences of policy outcomes are described by a
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility representation ui : X →  and a common discount
factor δ ∈ [0, 1) as follows. Given a sequence x1, x2, . . . of policies over time, i’s payoff is
(1 − δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1ui(xt ).
Of course, the outcomes of the bargaining game deﬁned above are of a simple form:
either the status quo obtains in every period, in which case i’s payoff is just ui(q), or
some other proposal is passed in some period; in that case, i receives payoff
(1 − δt−1)ui(q) + δt−1ui(x)
if policy x is proposed and accepted in period t .
We assume throughout that each ui is continuous and concave. In the Appendix,
we deﬁne a further technical condition on utilities that is assumed throughout. The
condition, called limited shared weak preference (LSWP), says that any policy y that is
weakly preferred to a policy x by all members of a decisive coalition can be approximated
by policies that all coalition members strictly prefer to x. An implication of LSWP, with
our other conditions, is that each legislator i has a unique ideal point, denoted x˜i , that is
strictly preferred to every other policy, i.e., ui(x˜i) > ui(y) for all y ∈ X \ {x˜i}. Many
familiar environments satisfy LSWP, including the following.5
• Classical spatial model/Pure public goods.Alternatives are vectors of ideological policies
or public good levels. Each ui is strictly quasi-concave, as when ui(x) = −||x − x˜i||
or ui(x) = −||x − x˜i||2.
• Public decisions with transfers.The policy space X is a subset of Z × T , where Z is a
space of public decisions and T ⊆ n is a space of allocations of a district-speciﬁc
good, and each ui is quasi-linear: ui(z, t) = φi(z)+ ti , with φi strictly quasi-concave.
• Divide the dollar. The policy space is X = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ n+ |
∑
i∈N xi ≤ 1},
representing allocations of pork to legislative districts, and ui(x) is strictly increasing
in xi , constant in the consumption of other legislative districts.
• Local public goods. Alternatives are allocations of any number of local public goods
to districts, where each ui is strictly quasi-concave and strictly monotonic in the
consumption of i’s district, constant in the consumption of other districts.
The more familiar condition of strict quasi-concavity is sufﬁcient for LSWP, but it is
not satisﬁed in the last three models, which we consider to be of potential importance for
applications. The last model, in particular, generalizes divide-the-dollar environments
but has not to our knowledge been considered in analyses of legislative policy-making.
We therefore use the weaker LSWP condition.
Given a collection of decisive coalitions and legislator preferences, we deﬁne the core,
denoted K , as the set of policies that cannot be overturned by any decisive coalition.
5 In Banks and Duggan (1999), we prove that LSWP holds in two general models, from which all of
the examples below can be obtained as special cases.
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Formally,
K =
{
x ∈ X
∣∣∣∣ there do not exist y ∈ X and C ∈ Dsuch that, for all i ∈ C, ui(y) > ui(x)
}
.
For a familiar example of the core, let the voting rule D be unanimity rule, so that a
policy x is in the core if and only if there is no policy y such that ui(y) > ui(x) for every
legislator i ∈ N , i.e., x is weakly Pareto optimal. In this case, the core is nonempty and
often quite large. When the set of policies is unidimensional and D is majority rule, it is
known that the core is nonempty and consists of the median ideal point, or perhaps the
interval between two median ideal points if the number of legislators is even. The core
has a similar characterization in the general unidimensional case, as long as the voting
rule is proper: it is nonempty and consists of the interval between two legislators’ ideal
points.6 In higher dimensional spaces, however, Plott (1967) and others have shown that
the majority core points must satisfy conditions so restrictive that they would almost
never be met in reality. Banks (1995) and Saari (1997) extend these results to other
voting rules that require less than unanimity for passage. Thus, if there are many issue
dimensions, the core is typically empty for such voting rules.
Complete information of preferences, the structure of the game form, etc., is assumed
throughout.A history of length t in the bargaining game describes all that has transpired in
the ﬁrst t periods (who the previous proposers were, what they proposed, how legislators
voted), and a strategy for a legislator is a mapping specifying an intended action (what
to propose, how to vote) as a function of all histories of all lengths. Since our focus in
this paper is only on equilibria in stationary strategies, we provide a formal deﬁnition
only of such strategies. A (pure) stationary strategy for legislator i consists of a proposal
pi ∈ X, to be offered anytime i is recognized, and a measurable voting rule ri : X →
{accept, reject}. For the latter, we will use the more convenient representation of an
acceptance set, Ai = r−1i (accept), i.e., the set of proposals that i would vote to accept.
Given a proﬁle (A1, . . . , An) of acceptance sets and given C ⊆ N , deﬁne the set
AC =
⋂
i∈C
Ai
of proposals acceptable to all members of C, and deﬁne the social acceptance set
A =
⋃
C∈D
AC,
consisting of proposals that could be passed in any and all periods.
It turns out that mixtures over proposals are required for our most general existence
result, so let P(X) denote the set of probability distributions on X and endow P(X)
with the topology of weak convergence.7 Given Y ⊆ X, let P(Y ) denote the subset of
6 See the Appendix for a formal statement.
7 Formally, P(X) is the set of Borel probability measures on X. A sequence {πk} of probability
measures converges weakly to π if and only if, for every (bounded) continuous function f : X → ,
we have
∫
f dπk → ∫ f dπ .
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probability distributions on X that place probability one on Y . Let πi ∈ P(X) denote
a mixed stationary proposal for legislator i, where πi(Y ) denotes the probability that i
proposes an alternative in the set Y , and let π = (π1, . . . , πn) denote a proﬁle of mixed
stationary proposals. A mixed stationary strategy for i is a pair σi = (πi, Ai), and we
let σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) denote a proﬁle of mixed stationary strategies. It is important to
note that any randomization over proposals takes place before voting: the legislators know
which policy has been proposed before they cast their votes.
Informally, a proﬁle σ constitutes a stationary equilibrium if, for every legislator
i ∈ N , the proposal strategy πi is optimal given the acceptance sets (A1, . . . , An) of
the other legislators, and the acceptance set Ai is optimal given that σ describes what
would happen if the current proposal were rejected. To formalize these conditions,
note ﬁrst that any strategy proﬁle σ deﬁnes in an obvious (if notationally dense) man-
ner a probability distribution over sequences of outcomes and, with it, an expected
utility vi(σ ) for each legislator i ∈ N as evaluated at the beginning of the game. By
stationarity, this is also i’s continuation value throughout the game, i.e., i’s expected
utility evaluated at the beginning of next period if the current period’s proposal is
rejected.
Formally, σ is a stationary equilibrium if two conditions hold. First, we require that the
legislators’ acceptance sets satisfy weak dominance, i.e., legislator i votes for proposal x if
and only if the utility from x is at least that of rejecting the proposal and continuing to
the next period.8 That is, for all i ∈ N , we require that
Ai = {x ∈ X | ui(x) ≥ (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ )}.
This condition eliminates implausible equilibria in which, for instance, under majority
rule everyone accepts every proposal independently of preferences: the problem in such
situations is that no one’s vote will change the outcome of the game, and hence everyone’s
vote is a best response, despite the fact that some legislatorsmay be voting for undesirable
policies. Note that weak dominance implies q ∈ Ai if δ = 0. Second, we require that
the legislators’ proposals satisfy sequential rationality, i.e., legislator i, when recognized
as proposer, either chooses utility-maximizing outcomes from within A or chooses an
outcome that will be rejected, depending on which yields the higher payoff. That is, for
all i ∈ N , we require that
πi(arg max{ui(y) | y ∈ A}) = 1
when sup{ui(y) | y ∈ A} > (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ ); that πi(X \ A) = 1 when the
inequality is reversed; and that πi place probability one on the union of these two sets
when equality holds.
The explicit formula for legislator i’s continuation value, given stationary strategy
proﬁle σ , is straightforward to derive: it is
vi(σ ) =
∑
j∈N ρj
[∫
A
ui(z)πj (dz) + (1 − δ)πj (X \ A)ui(q)
]
1 − δ∑
j∈N ρjπj (X \ A)
. (1)
8 Baron and Kalai (1993) refer to such strategies as “stage-undominated.”
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Since the discount factor δ is identical across legislators, we may write each vi(σ ) as the
expectation of ui with respect to a single probability distribution, say ν, independent
of i. This is explicitly deﬁned in the Appendix. Let γ be the probability distribution on
X that selects the status quo q with probability (1 − δ) and with probability δ draws an
alternative from the distribution ν. Then the expectation of ui with respect to γ is just
(1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ ), and weak dominance can be written as
Ai =
{
x ∈ X | ui(x) ≥
∫
ui(z)γ (dz)
}
.
That is, legislator i votes for proposals with utility at least equal to i’s expected utility
under γ . Because γ contains all of the relevant information for any legislator to evaluate
any proposed policy, we refer to γ as the continuation distribution corresponding to σ .
Letting x(γ ) denote the mean of the continuation distribution, concavity of ui implies
ui(x(γ )) ≥
∫
uidγ . We conclude that, given any proﬁle σ satisfying weak dominance,
x(γ ) ∈ Ai for every legislator i ∈ N . In particular, the social acceptance set A will be
nonempty for such proﬁles.
A stationary equilibriumwith delay is a proﬁle σ in which, with some positive probabil-
ity, a proposal is rejected in the ﬁrst (or any) period. Formally, this is
∑
i∈N ρiπi(A) < 1.
A no-delay stationary equilibrium is then a proﬁle such that each legislator proposes only
policies in the acceptance set, i.e.,
∑
i∈N ρiπi(A) = 1. Note that the status quo may
be the outcome of a no-delay equilibrium, if it is in the social acceptance set and it is
proposed with positive probability, i.e., if q ∈ A and πi({q}) > 0 for some legislator i.
In a no-delay equilibrium, i’s continuation value takes the especially simple form,
vi(σ ) =
∑
j∈N
ρj
∫
ui(z) πj (dz), (2)
where the terms in (1) multiplied byπi(X\A) disappear, as they correspond to outcomes
following rejected proposals.
A static stationary equilibrium is one in which the status quo is maintained with
probability one, either because no policy is ever passed or because the status quo is the
only policy passed with positive probability. Formally, these are proﬁles σ such that∑
i∈N ρiπi(A \ {q}) = 0. Such equilibria might exhibit delay or might not, as when the
status quo is socially acceptable and all legislators propose it.
SPECIAL CASES OFTHE MODEL
In this section, we survey some special cases of the bargaining model and provide explicit
solutions for stationary equilibria. Models 1, 2, and 5 imbed well-known models in the
inﬁnite-horizon framework with an arbitrary status quo. Other special cases extend the
theory to new environments, such as the unidimensionalModel 3, where the comparison
between the equilibria of our model and the predictions of the median voter theorem are
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particularly interesting.While interesting applications in their own right, these examples
will motivate many of the theoretical results to follow, and they will serve to demonstrate
the limits of those results as well.
Model 1: The Romer–Rosenthal model. Let the agenda setter be n with ρn = 1, let the
number n− 1 of voters be odd, let X ⊆ , let the voting rule be DRR, and let each ui be
quadratic with ideal point x˜i , i.e., ui(x) = −|x − x˜i|2. Let legislator m have the median
ideal point among N \ {n}, and assume x˜m < x˜n. Though Romer and Rosenthal (1978a,
1978b) analyze a static model, i.e., δ = 0, we allow any δ < 1 here. By Lemma 1 of
Banks and Duggan (2005a), the assumption of quadratic utilities implies that legislator
m is decisive: x ∈ A if and only if um(x) ≥ (1 − δ)um(q) + δvm(σ ) in any no-delay
stationary equilibrium. Thus, legislator n’s proposal pn must satisfy
um(pn) ≥ (1 − δ)um(q) + δvm(σ ) (3)
in any no-delay equilibrium. Assuming q is close enough to x˜m, namely |q − x˜m| <
|x˜n − x˜m|, this constraint will be binding: otherwise, since um(pn) = vm(σ ) in
equilibrium, we would have um(pn) > um(q), and the agenda setter would do better to
propose slightly to the right of pn, contradicting sequential rationality. Thus, when the
status quo is close to the median legislator, the proposal constraint (3) is indeed binding.
Since um(pn) = vm(σ ) in equilibrium, we must therefore have um(pn) = um(q).
We conclude that the unique no-delay stationary equilibrium, independent of the
discount factor, is such thatpn = x˜m+|q−x˜m|, as in Romer andRosenthal’s staticmodel.
In the above model, the status quo is proposed by the agenda setter if and only if it
coincides with the core of the voting rule DRR, i.e., q = x˜m. In this case, the core point
is the unique policy outcome. And when the status quo is close to the core, the agenda
setter n’s optimal proposal is close to the core as well. Note that we used the assumption
of quadratic utilities to derive the same solution in our inﬁnite-horizon model as did
Romer and Rosenthal (1979a, 1979b) in their static model. If that assumption is relaxed,
the models will generally have different solutions.
Model 2: TheKrehbiel model.Let n be the executive, let the number n−1 of legislators
be odd, let X = [0, 1], let the voting rule be DK , and let each ui be quadratic with ideal
point x˜i . Let legislator m have the median ideal point among N \ {n}, and let ρm = 1.
Though Krehbiel (1996, 1998) analyzes a static model, i.e., δ = 0, we allow any δ < 1
here.Assuming the executive’s ideal point is greater than those of the legislators, index the
legislators in increasing order of their ideal points: x˜1 < x˜2 < · · · < x˜n. Ignoring integer
problems, identify the legislators v = 2(n − 1)/3 (the veto pivot) and f = 2(n − 1)/5
(the ﬁlibuster pivot). It can be checked that the core of the voting ruleDK is just [x˜f , x˜v].
In any no-delay stationary equilibrium σ , legislator i votes for proposal x if and only if
ui(x) ≥ (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ ). Letting pm denote legislator m’s equilibrium proposal,
we argue that it must take the following form. First, we claim that, if q < x˜f , then
pm = min{2x˜f − q, x˜m}.
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To see why, note that sequential rationality trivially implies q ≤ pm. Furthermore,
vi(σ ) = ui(pm) for every legislator i ∈ N in any no-delay stationary equilibrium,
so i votes for pm in equilibrium if and only if ui(pm) ≥ ui(q). Then we must have
uf (pm) ≥ uf (q), for otherwise the proposal would not receive the vote of the ﬁlibuster
pivot f or any legislator i ≤ f , so less than three ﬁfths of legislators would vote to accept,
and the proposal would fail, a contradiction. An implication is that pm ≤ 2x˜f − q. That
pm ≤ x˜m follows from sequential rationality: if x˜m < pm ≤ 2x˜f − q, then the median
legislator could propose slightly to the left of pm, this proposal would still gain the
support of every legislator i ≥ f and still pass,9 improving the outcome for m and
contradicting sequential rationality. Thus, pm is no greater than 2x˜f − q or x˜m. If pm
is strictly less than the minimum of these two quantities, i.e., pm < min{2x˜f − q, x˜m},
then the median legislator would do better to propose slightly to the right of pm, again
contradicting sequential rationality. This establishes the claim. Second, if q ∈ [x˜f , x˜v],
then we can show that pm = q. Last, if x˜v < q, then we have
pm = max{2x˜v − q, x˜m}.
In fact, this is the solution derived by Krehbiel in his static model. Note that, as
the status quo moves from zero to x˜f , pm moves from the median toward x˜f ; for
q ∈ [x˜f , x˜v], pm equals the status quo; and as the status quo moves from x˜v to one, pm
moves continuously away from x˜v and toward x˜m.
In the abovemodel, the status quo is not proposed by themedian legislator unless it is in
the core of the voting rule DK. If the status quo does lie in the core, the interval [x˜f , x˜v],
then it is the median legislator’s unique optimal proposal and the unique bargaining
outcome in every period. This can certainly occur while the status quo is distinct from
the median legislator’s ideal point, i.e., q = x˜m, and in that case a majority of legislators
would in fact prefer the median ideal point to the bargaining outcome, a phenomenon
referred to as “gridlock” byKrehbiel (1996, 1998).The above analysis shows that gridlock
either does not occur (a policy other than the status quo is proposed by the median
legislator and passes) or is complete (the status quo obtains in every period). Finally, note
that when the status quo is close to the core, the median legislator’s optimal proposal is
close to the core as well.
The next model gives our ﬁrst example of the bargaining approach applied to the case
of a unidimensional policy space and majority rule.
Model 3: One dimension, majority rule.Let n be odd, letX = [0, 1], let each ρi = 1/n,
let D be majority rule, and let each ui be quadratic with ideal point x˜i . Assume x˜1 <
x˜2 < · · · < x˜n, and let q ≤ x˜m, where m = (n + 1)/2 is the median legislator. We look
for a no-delay stationary equilibrium of the following form: pi = x˜m −  for all i < m,
pm = x˜m, and pi = x˜i +  for all i > m, where  > 0 is ﬁxed. Let each Ai consist of
9 The argument that all legislators i ≥ f to the right of the ﬁlibuster pivot would vote for the new
proposal uses the fact that, with quadratic utilities, legislator preferences over lotteries are order
restricted. This is proved by Cho and Duggan (2003).
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the policies that give legislator i utility at least vi = (1 − δ)ui(q) + (δ/n)∑nj=1 ui(pj ).
By construction, therefore, weak dominance will be satisﬁed. We then need only ﬁnd
a value of  consistent with sequential rationality. By Lemma 1 of Banks and Duggan
(2005a), legislator m is decisive: x ∈ A if and only if um(x) ≥ (1 − δ)um(q) + δvm. So
let  satisfy
um(x˜m − ) = (1 − δ)um(q) + δ
n
[∑
i<m
um(x˜m − ) + um(x˜m) +
∑
i>m
um(x˜m + )
]
,
or, equivalently,
2 = (1 − δ)(x˜m − q)2 + δ(n − 1)
n
2.
Solving, we ﬁnd that
 =
√
(1 − δ)(x˜m − q)2
1 − δ(n − 1)/n .
For δ close enough to one or for q close enough to x˜m, we have x˜i < pi = minA
for all i < m and maxA = pi < x˜i for all i > m, delivering sequential rationality.
Note the logic of this equilibrium: by strict concavity, the utility from the policy
(1 − δ)q + δx˜m is strictly greater than the continuation value vi for each legislator i;
this gives any legislator i, when selected as proposer, a wedge to pull the policy outcome
toward i’s ideal point by a small amount. When q = x˜m, we have  = 0, so that every
legislator proposes the median and it is the outcome with probability one. It would
then also be an equilibrium for every legislator to propose zero while keeping the
same acceptance sets as in the latter equilibrium: then every proposal will be rejected,
so the equilibrium exhibits delay, and themedian is still the outcomewith probability one.
In the above model, we have found a stationary equilibrium in pure strategies, and
the equilibrium is no-delay. Furthermore, the core point, x˜m, is proposed and passed
with positive probability, but other proposals may be passed as well. Finally, the social
acceptance set collapses to the core as legislators become arbitrarily patient or as the
status quo converges to the core:  → 0 as δ → 1 or as q → x˜m. This illustrates the
general claims made above that legislative patience leads to moderate outcomes, as do
moderate status quos. Note also that when the status quo coincides with the legislative
median, i.e., q = x˜m, the social acceptance set collapses to this point, and the core policy
is selected with probability one. Otherwise, when q = x˜m, the status quo is the outcome
with probability zero.Thus, as in the Romer–Rosenthal and Krehbiel models, the status
quo is an all or nothing proposition.
Model 4: Two dimensions, core point exists. Let n = 5, X = [−1, 1] × [−1, 1], let each
ρi = 1/5, let q = (0, 0), letD be majority rule, and let ui(x) = −||x− x˜i||λ, with λ ≥ 1
and ideal points at (0, 0), (1, 0), (−1, 0), (0, 1), and (0,−1).That is, the legislators’ ideal
points are at the center and four corners of a square, and indifference curves are perfect
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circles centered around them. Of course, the unique core point is (0, 0). We look for a
no-delay stationary equilibrium of the form pi = (1 − α)x˜i for each legislator i, where
α ∈ [0, 1], and i’s proposal is accepted by the legislators at the two adjacent corners of
the square. In such an equilibrium, legislator i with x˜i = (0, 0)would have continuation
value
vi = −δ5 [α
λ + 1 + 2(2 − 2α + α2)λ + (2 − α)λ].
LettingAi consist of the policies x satisfying ||x− x˜i||λ ≤ (1−δ)−δvi , weak dominance
will be satisﬁed. We then need only specify a value of α consistent with sequential
rationality. We do so for the values λ = 2, 4. When λ = 2, it is straightforward to verify
that α = 1, i.e., pi = (0, 0) for every legislator i ∈ N , yields a stationary equilibrium: in
this case, each legislator’s continuation value is −1 and each accepts a proposal only if it
yields a utility at least that of the core point; then the optimal proposal is indeed (0, 0).
When λ = 4, this is still an equilibrium. It can be checked that α = 0, meaning that all
legislators propose their own ideal points, is also an equilibrium, as long as δ ≥ 3/4.
Consider the proposal of the legislator with ideal point (1, 0). That legislator proposes
(1, 0), which gives the adjacent legislators utility −4. Their continuation values are
−5δ. So given our speciﬁcation of acceptance sets, they accept (1, 0) if 4 ≤ 1 + 4δ,
which holds if δ ≥ 3/4. Thus, (1, 0) is accepted by a majority and is that legislator’s
optimal proposal, and similarly for the other legislators.
In the above model, regardless of λ, the status quo is proposed by the legislator with
ideal point at the status quo, which is in the core. In contrast to the q = x˜m case
from Model 3, there may be no-delay equilibria in which other legislators propose other
policies, even though the status quo is in the core. In contrast with all of the preceding
models, in the next the core is empty.
Model 5: The Baron and Ferejohn model with arbitrary status quo. Let n be odd, let
X = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ n+ |
∑
i∈N xi ≤ 1} be the unit simplex in n, let D be majority
rule, and let ui(x1, . . . , xn) = xi . We generalize Baron and Ferejohn (1989) by allowing
for an arbitrary q ∈ X, whereas they assume q = 0.Wewill look for a no-delay stationary
equilibrium such that each legislator offers a positive amount of a resource to a randomly
chosen subset of (n − 1)/2 other legislators, and each legislator’s expected payoff from
rejection is
r = 1
n
(
(1 − δ)
(
n∑
i=1
qi
)
+ δ
)
. (4)
Also let si denote the probability that, conditional on not being the proposer, legislator i
is offered a positive amount of the resource, e.g., si = 1/2 if all proposers randomize
uniformly over subsets of legislators. In such an equilibrium, if i offers a positive amount
of resource to another legislator, that amount will simply be r . Thus, the optimal payoff
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to a legislator i when selected to propose will be
1 − r
(
n − 1
2
)
,
reﬂecting the fact that i offers r to (n − 1)/2 others and keeps the rest of the resource.
Legislator i’s continuation value in such an equilibrium would be
vi = (1 − ρi)sir + ρi
(
1 − r(n − 1)
2
)
,
reﬂecting the fact that, when someone else proposes, i is offered the amount r with
probability si . Then i’s payoff from rejecting a proposal is
(1 − δ)qi + δ(1 − ρi)sir + δρi
(
1 − r(n − 1)
2
)
.
Setting this equal to r and solving for si , we have
si = r − (1 − δ)qi − δρi
(
1 − r(n−1)
2
)
δ(1 − ρi)r
= r − δρi
(
1 − r(n−1)
2
)
δ(1 − ρi)r − qi
1 − δ
δ(1 − ρi)r . (5)
For the case qi = q ∈ [0, 1/n] for all i ∈ N , so the legislators have equal consumption
q of the resource in the status quo, and each ρi = 1/n, we then have si = 1/2 and
r = (1 − δ)q + δ
n
.
Thus, a subset of (n−1)/2 non-proposers is chosen at randomwith eachmember offered
r , deﬁned above, while the proposer keeps 1 − r(n − 1)/2, or equivalently,
1 − (1 − δ)(n − 1)q
2
+ δ(n − 1)
2n
.
Setting q = 0, as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), non-proposers are offered r = δ/n
and the proposer keeps 1 − δ(n − 1)/2n. Setting q = 1/n, so the legislators split the
resource evenly in the status quo, non-proposers are offered 1/n and the proposer keeps
(n + 1)/2n. Thus, increasing the status quo q decreases the rent of the proposer. If the
recognition probabilities are close to 1/n and the status quo is close to q = (q, . . . , q),
then the probability that i is offered a positive amount of the resource is given by (5), and
the amount of the offer is given by (4). The probabilities in (5) correspond to stationary
equilibria whenever si ∈ [0, 1] for each i.10 Assuming∑ni=1 qi = 1, so the status quo is
10 A caveat is that si is the marginal probability on i being offered a positive amount of resource,
derived from a distribution on subsets of size (n − 1)/2. Given an arbitrary (s1, . . . , sn), there is
the question of whether these marginal probabilities can be derived from such a distribution. A
necessary condition is that
∑
si = n/2, a condition satisﬁed by (5) when each ρi = 1/n. The
condition is sufﬁcient when n = 3, but we leave the question of the general case open.
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Pareto efﬁcient, the conditions for this are as follows.When qi ≥ 1/n, then si ≥ 0 if and
only if
ρi <
2
n + 1 and
2(nqi − 1)
2 − ρi(n + 1) ≤
δ
1 − δ ,
and si ≤ 1 is not binding. When qi ≤ 1/n, then si ≥ 0 if and only if either ρi < 2/
(n + 1) or
ρi >
2
n + 1 and
2(nqi − 1)
2 − ρi(n + 1) ≥
δ
1 − δ ,
and si ≤ 1 if and only if
2(nqi − 1)
n − 1 ≤
δρi
1 − δ .
When ρi = qi = 1/n, as mentioned above, si = 1/2 ∈ [0, 1] and the above conditions
hold for all δ. An implication is that we do not have equilibria of the conjectured form
in certain cases, e.g., when qi > 1/n and ρi is too high, or when qi > 1/n, ρi is low, but
δ is too low. In the latter cases, there is no way to bring i’s expected payoff of rejection
down to r , and, in equilibrium, i will never be offered a positive amount of the resource.
In contrast to the preceding models, the next admits a stationary equilibrium in which
delay occurs with positive probability. Note that the legislators in this model are risk
neutral.
Model 6: An equilibrium with delay. Let n = 3, X = [0, 1], each ρi = 1/3, q = 0,
let D be majority rule, u1(x) = 1 − x, and u2(x) = u3(x) = x. These utility functions
are concave and strictly quasi-concave but linear. It can be checked that there exists a
no-delay stationary equilibrium here, but we look for a stationary equilibrium with delay
of the following form: p1 = 0, A1 = [0, x(γ )], p2 = p3 = 1, and A2 = A3 = [x(γ ), 1].
Using the expression for γ in the Appendix, we have
γ ({0}) = 1 − δ + δ
(
ρ1(1 − δ)
1 − δρ1
)
γ ({1}) = δ
(
ρ2 + ρ3
1 − δρ1
)
.
Thus,
x(γ ) = δ
(
ρ2 + ρ3
1 − δρ1
)
.
By risk neutrality, the acceptance sets so-deﬁned satisfy weak dominance, and proposal
strategies clearly satisfy sequential rationality. But, because legislator 1’s proposal is
rejected and the other legislators propose a socially acceptable policy distinct from the
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status quo, this equilibrium exhibits delay: with probability ρ1 > 0, the status quo q = 0
will be obtained for a ﬁnite number of periods and be replaced by x = 1.To see how the
logic of the equilibrium in Model 3 breaks down, note that by risk neutrality, the utility
from the expected outcome upon rejection, x(γ ), is exactly equal to the continuation
value vi for each legislator i. Thus, when legislator 1 is selected to propose, the legislator
has no way to pull the policy outcome toward zero while providing legislators 2 and 3
with utility at least equal to their continuation values. Equilibrium delay would not be
possible given these three legislators if we let just one, say legislator 2, have a strictly
concave utility function: then legislator 1 could offer 2 a policy slightly to the left of
x(γ ), and this would pass.11
Finally, we turn to a model in which the legislators use a supermajority voting rule to
choose from a two-dimensional policy space. Recall that in Models 1–3, when the status
quo was in the core, it was the only possible bargaining outcome. In Model 4, when the
status quo was at (0, 0), the core point, it was proposed by at least one legislator, but
others could propose other policies. In contrast, in the next model the status quo is in
the core, yet it is proposed by no legislator. Moreover, the status quo is not even in the
social acceptance set.
Model 7: An equilibrium in which the status quo lies in the core but is not socially acceptable.
Let n = 5, let X ⊆ 2 with status quo q as in Figure 1, and let each ρi = 1/5.
Deﬁne the supermajority voting rule D so that four or more votes are required for
passage: D = {C ⊆ N | |C| ≥ 4}. Let the utility functions ui have ideal points and
circular indifference curves as in Figure 1. Let legislator 1 mix over x and y with equal
probabilities, and let each legislator i = 2, 3, 4, 5 propose pi , as in Figure 1. We further
specify utilities as follows. Deﬁning
vi = ui(x) + ui(y)10 +
1
5
5∑
j=2
ui(pj )
for each legislator, we require
u1(p3) = u1(p4) = (1 − δ)u1(q) + δv1
u2(x) = (1 − δ)u2(q) + δv2
u3(y) = u3(p5) = u3(p4) = (1 − δ)u3(q) + δv3
u4(x) = u4(p2) = u4(p3) = (1 − δ)u4(q) + δv4
u5(y) = (1 − δ)u5(q) + δv5.
It is clear that this is consistent with our assumption that utilities be concave. Letting Ai
consist of policies x such that ui(x) ≥ (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi , weak dominance is satisﬁed,
11 But if we replicate these legislators one time, for a total of six, and if we let just legislator 2 have
a strictly concave utility function, then we still have delay: a proposal slightly to the left of x(γ )
would garner only three votes and would fail.
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1
Figure 1. Legislator ideal points and proposals
and it is then clear from Figure 1 that sequential rationality is satisﬁed as well. Here, the
core is the shaded polygon and contains the status quo, yet legislators 1, 2, and 5 would
vote against the status quo if it were proposed.
GENERAL RESULTS ON LEGISLATIVE BARGAINING
Existence of Stationary Equilibria
In this subsection, we address two theoretical issues of fundamental importance for the
applicability of the model described in the previous sections, namely, the existence and
continuity properties of stationary equilibria. In each of the models of the previous
section, a no-delay stationary equilibrium exists. Our ﬁrst theorem establishes existence
of no-delay stationary equilibria as a general result, despite the possibility that the status
quo is favorable to some legislators.
Theorem 1 There exists a no-delay stationary equilibrium.
A further desirable property of equilibria is uniqueness. As Model 4 demonstrates,
however, there may be multiple no-delay stationary equilibria, and in fact these need not
even be payoff-equivalent. Cho and Duggan (2003) provide a unidimensional example
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with multiple stationary equilibria that are not payoff equivalent, so it is known that no
general uniqueness result is available.12 The above existence proof uses mixed proposal
strategies because, given stationary strategies for the other legislators, the set of proposals
optimal for a legislator need not be convex.This possible non-convexitymay arise because
the set of socially acceptable proposalsmay itself be non-convex, as inModel 5.Thus, as in
the theory of Nash equilibrium, mixing serves an important technical role in establishing
existence of stationary equilibria.
In the unidimensional Models 1, 2, and 3, however, we found only pure strategy
equilibria.The next theorem establishes this as a general result for unidimensional policy
spaces. In fact, the result holds with no limit on the number of issues for a restricted class
of voting rules. We say the voting rule D is oligarchic if there is a nonempty coalition
C ⊆ N of legislators that is decisive and is contained in every other decisive coalition,
i.e., D = {C ′ ⊆ N | C ⊆ C ′}. This class of rules does not include majority rule, but
it does contain the interesting case of unanimity rule. As another example, consider a
majoritarian parliament where bargaining takes place among parties, which have weights
in proportion to their size; if there is one party with more than half of the seats, then the
voting rule is oligarchic.
Theorem 2 Assume either d = 1 or the voting rule D is oligarchic. Every no-delay
stationary equilibrium is in pure strategies.
This result simpliﬁes the analysis of the bargainingmodel in a variety of environments,
where we only need to work with pure proposal strategies, which are more tractable than
mixed strategies.ThatTheorem 2 does not hold in multiple dimensions is demonstrated
in Model 5, where we have found mixed strategy equilibria. Furthermore, Model 6
in Banks and Duggan (2005b) provides an example of mixed strategy equilibria in the
multidimensional spatial setting, where legislators have quadratic utilities.
We next take up the issue of equilibrium continuity with respect to the parameters
of our model, i.e., the recognition probabilities ρi , the status quo q, and the discount
factor δ. In addition, so that we may analyze the effect of varying legislator preferences,
we parameterize the utility functions of the legislators byλ, which lies in a subset ⊆ k
of ﬁnite-dimensional Euclidean space. That is, we expand the domain of the legislators’
utility functions to ui : X ×  → , and we assume that each ui is jointly continuous
in (x, λ), that each ui(·, λ) is concave in x, and that LSWP is satisﬁed for all λ ∈ .
Thus, when we ﬁx the parameter λ at some value, the implied utility functions ui(·, λ)
correspond to an instance of our model, as described above. As an example of such a
parameterization, it could be that λ is a vector (λ1, . . . , λn)with each λi representing the
ideal point of a quadratic utility function for legislator i, i.e., ui(x, λ) = −||x − λi||2.13
For parameters ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρn), q, δ, and λ, let E(ρ, q, δ, λ) denote the set of proﬁles
12 Cho and Duggan (2003) prove that there is exactly one no-delay stationary equilibrium under
the assumption of quadratic utilities. More generally, they prove that the social acceptance sets of
no-delay stationary equilibria are nested, and that the minimal and maximal equilibria are unique.
13 More generally, λi might be the matrix deﬁning weighted Euclidean distance utilities (see Hinich
and Munger 1997).
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of no-delay stationary equilibrium mixed proposal strategies. Our next result formalizes
the idea that small variations in (ρ, q, δ, λ) cannot lead the set E(ρ, q, δ, λ) of no-delay
stationary equilibria to expand discontinuously.14
Theorem3 The correspondenceE of no-delay stationary equilibria is upper hemicontinuous
in the parameters of the model.
This continuity of the no-delay stationary equilibrium proposal strategies is familiar
from the Romer–Rosenthal model (Model 1), where the agenda setter’s proposal pn =
x˜m + |q − x˜m| is clearly continuous in q. Moreover, because there is a unique no-delay
stationary equilibrium when ρn = 1, no-delay stationary equilibrium proposals will be
close to this when ρn is close to one or when utility functions are close to quadratic. In the
Krehbiel model (Model 2), continuity of the median’s proposal with respect to the status
quo is also apparent. And, because there is a unique no-delay stationary equilibrium
when ρm = 1, no-delay stationary equilibrium proposals will be close to this when ρm
is close to one or when utilities are close to quadratic. Continuity is also demonstrated
in Model 3, where  is a continuous function of the discount factor, the median voter’s
ideal point, and the status quo. Similarly, continuity is exhibited in Model 5, where the
probability of being offered a positive amount of resource and the amount of the offer
are continuous in the parameters of the model.
That Theorem 3 does not extend to all stationary equilibria, including those with
delay, can be seen from Model 6. There, we found a stationary equilibrium in which
legislator 1 proposes p1 = 0, which is rejected. Indeed, we could have speciﬁed any
p1 ∈ [0, x(γ )), as all of these proposal would also be rejected. However, ﬁxing the
others’ strategies, p1 = x(γ ) does not constitute a stationary equilibrium.The reason is
that this proposal would be accepted, increasing the continuation values of legislators 2
and 3 discontinuously, and then the acceptance sets A2 = A3 = x(γ ) would no longer
satisfy weak dominance. We conclude that the set of all stationary equilibrium proposal
strategies is not even closed.
Stability of the Status Quo
We now turn to the issue of stability of the status quo in the stationary equilibria of our
bargaining model and, in particular, the possibility of delay. We have already established
the existence of equilibria without delay, but Theorem 1 leaves open the possibility that
there are other equilibria in which some proposals are rejected. This is an especially
interesting issue because delay is difﬁcult to explain in models of complete information,
and because it is an empirically observable aspect of the bargaining process. Recall that,
of the special cases with strictly concave utilities, the only equilibria with delay were
in Model 3, where the status quo was at the median and there was a static equilibrium
in which every proposal was rejected. Our next theorem establishes this as a general
14 A correspondence  : X ⇒ Y is upper hemicontinuous if given each point x in the domain and
each open set G containing (x), the set inclusion (x) ⊆ G is maintained by arbitrarily small
perturbations of x. See theAppendix for a formal deﬁnition for the equilibrium correspondence E.
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result: if legislators put any positive weight on the future, and if utility functions are
strictly concave, then every stationary equilibrium is either no-delay or static. Thus, the
outcome of bargaining in the ﬁrst period will be the outcome in every period, whether it
is the status quo or some other policy immediately agreed upon.
As phrased above, this result applies to the classical spatial model, but not to environ-
ments with a district-speciﬁc good, such as divide-the-dollar environments and local
public good economies, where strict concavity is generally violated. In the Baron–
Ferejohn model, however, we again found no equilibria with delay.We extend this obser-
vation to environments in which the sum of utilities is strictly concave and in which
limited transfers are possible. We say the condition of limited transferability is satisﬁed if,
for every policy x ∈ X and every legislator i ∈ N , ui(x) > min{ui(y) | y ∈ X} implies
there is a policy z ∈ X such that, for every other legislator j = i, we have uj(z) > uj(x).
The idea is that we can take goods away from legislator i and spread them across the
remaining legislative districts, making those legislators better off.This is clearly possible
in local public good economies, and the sum of utilities will also be strictly concave if
every legislator’s utility is strictly concave in his/her own district’s consumption.
Theorem 4 Assume δ > 0, and assume that (i) there is a decisive coalition C all the
members of which have strictly concave utility functions, i.e., ui is strictly concave for all
i ∈ C, or that (ii) the sum of utilities∑
i∈N ui is strictly concave and limited transferability
is satisﬁed. Every stationary equilibrium is either no-delay or static.
Equivalently, every stationary equilibrium with delay is static. An important implica-
tion of Model 6 is that the assumption of strict concavity in the ﬁrst part of Theorem 4
cannot be dropped completely: in that model we found an equilibrium in which delay
occurs with positive probability and yet the status quo is eventually replaced by another
policy with probability one.This shows that an interesting form of delay can be obtained
in our model, but that the role of risk neutrality was crucial in that example. Moreover,
the element of strict concavity in the second part cannot be dropped: if one legislator’s
status quo level of pork is too high in Model 5, then that legislator’s proposal will always
be rejected. That a positive discount factor is needed for Theorem 4 can be seen by
modifying Model 3 with x˜m−1 < q < x˜m and δ = 0. In the equilibrium found there,
legislator m − 1 proposes q, but having m − 1 propose x˜m−1, which is rejected is also a
stationary equilibrium: because δ = 0, this change does not affect continuation values
or acceptance sets, and legislator m − 1 is indifferent between that proposal and q, the
optimal choice from within the social acceptance set.
We now consider the possibility that in equilibrium all legislators propose the same
policy, meaning that there is no ex ante uncertainty about the outcome of bargaining.
In Models 3 and 4, we saw only two instances of such equilibria: in Model 3, with
q = x˜m, and in Model 4, with every legislator proposing q = (0, 0). In both cases the
equilibrium was static. Our next theorem shows that this connection holds generally and
that the conditions required for this coincidence of proposals are quite restrictive: unless
all legislators have the same ideal point, an equilibrium in which all legislators propose
the same policy must be static.
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Theorem 5 Assume that at least two legislators have distinct ideal points. If σ is a no-delay
stationary equilibrium inwhich every legislator proposes the same policy, i.e., there existsx ∈ X
such that πi({x}) = 1 for all i ∈ N , then σ is static.
Thus, delay (assuming δ > 0) and coincidence of proposals (assuming at least two
legislators have distinct ideal points) each imply a stationary equilibrium is static: the
status quo obtains with probability one in every period. How restrictive is this conclu-
sion? We saw static equilibria in Models 3 and 4, but only when the status quo was in
the core. Our next result establishes this as a general necessary and sufﬁcient condi-
tion for existence of a static equilibrium, under a very weak restriction on recognition
probabilities.
Theorem 6 Assume that every decisive coalition has positive recognition probability, i.e.,∑
i∈C ρi > 0 for all C ∈ D. There exists a static stationary equilibrium if and only if the
status quo is in the core, i.e., q ∈ K .
The possibility of delay or coincidence of proposals therefore hinges, under quite weak
conditions, on the possibility that the status quo lies in the core.When all legislators have
the same ideal point, contrary to the assumptions of Theorem 5, it is easy to construct
a stationary equilibrium exhibiting coincidence of proposals that is not static: every
legislator simply proposes the ideal point and votes for it. When some decisive coalition
has zero recognition probability, contrary to the assumptions ofTheorem 6, wemay have
a situation in which x˜i = q and ρi = 1 for some legislator, in which case every stationary
equilibrium is static, even if q /∈ K . Except in those cases, however, Theorems 5 and 6
establish very general conditions under which delay and coincidence of proposals each
imply that the status quo is in the core. In particular, they are possible only if the core
is nonempty, a knife-edge condition for majority rule when there are multiple issue
dimensions.The next corollary on the possibility of delay follows directly from the above
results.
Corollary 1 Assume that δ > 0, that ρi > 0 for every legislator i ∈ N , and that the status
quo is not in the core, i.e., q /∈ K . If each ui is strictly concave, then there are no stationary
equilibria with delay.
The corollary is most relevant for higher dimensional issue spaces and voting rules
such as majority rule, for then the core is almost always empty and q /∈ k almost always
holds. Our results have an even starker consequence when transfers are possible, for then,
for most voting rules of interest, the core is always empty. We say the voting rule D is
non-collegial if there is no legislator in every decisive coalition, i.e.,
⋂
C∈D C = ∅. This
is clearly true for majority rule and any supermajority rule short of unanimity.
Corollary 2 Assume that δ > 0, that ρi > 0 for every legislator i ∈ N , and that D is
non-collegial. If the sum of utilities
∑
i∈N ui is strictly concave and limited transferability is
satisﬁed, then there are no stationary equilibria with delay.
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Of course, similar corollaries hold for the possibility that all legislators propose the
same policy. We conclude that, for a very wide class of models, it will almost always be
the case that at least two legislators propose different policies with positive probability
and that the ﬁrst proposal will pass.
Core Selection
Theorem 6 yields a general condition under which there exists at least one station-
ary equilibrium that selects from the core with probability one: it is sufﬁcient that
the status quo lies in the core. In this subsection, we strengthen this result signif-
icantly by showing that, in many environments, if the status quo lies in the core,
then it is the outcome of every stationary equilibrium. Thus, for the case of majority
rule, bargaining equilibria always select from the set of medians, providing a game-
theoretic foundation for the well-known median voter theorem. Our result applies to
very general voting rules when the policy space is unidimensional and to the compara-
tively limited class of oligarchic voting rules when there are multiple issue dimensions.
Note that by Theorem 2, all stationary equilibria are in pure strategies under these
conditions.
Theorem 7 Assume that ρi > 0 for every legislator i ∈ N . Also assume that d = 1 and
D is proper or thatD is oligarchic. For every no-delay stationary equilibrium σ , the following
implications hold.
(i) A = {q} ⇔ (ii) q ∈ K ⇒ (iii) q ∈ A.
Moreover, if δ > 0, then (iii) ⇒ (ii).
The implication (iii) ⇒ (ii) shows that, if legislators put any positive weight on the
future and the status quo is not in the core (q /∈ K), then the status quo lies outside
the social acceptance set (q /∈ A). Thus, no legislator proposes the status quo in any
no-delay stationary equilibrium. If voting is by unanimity rule, so that the core is the
set of Pareto optimal policies, then this simply means that no legislator would propose a
Pareto-dominated status quo. Under majority rule, however, it means that no legislator
will propose the status quo if it lies outside the interval of medians, which of course
may be quite small. That δ > 0 is needed for the result can be seen from Model 3 by
setting δ = 0: then legislator 1 proposes p1 = q ∈ A. That the result does not hold
generally inmultiple dimensions can be seen fromModel 6 inBanks andDuggan (2005b),
where the core is empty, yet legislator 1 proposes the status quo, which is in the social
acceptance set.
By implication (ii) ⇒ (i), if the status quo is in the core, then it is the only socially
acceptable policy, and so it is the only possible proposal in a no-delay equilibrium.Adding
Theorems 4 and 6, it will therefore be the only possible outcome of any stationary
equilibrium, with or without delay. Thus, if the policy space is unidimensional or the
voting rule is oligarchic, and if the status quo is in the core, then the outcome of bargaining
necessarily lies in the core. If voting is by unanimity rule, this means that a Pareto
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optimal status quo will necessarily be the unique policy outcome. For majority rule in
one dimension, this generalizes the conclusion from Model 3, where q = x˜m implied
that every legislator proposes x˜m, the unique equilibrium outcome. That the result does
not hold generally in more than one dimension can be seen from Model 4 with λ = 4,
where the status quo is in the core but there is a no-delay equilibrium in which the status
quo is only proposed by one legislator. In fact, even the weaker implication (ii) ⇒ (iii)
does not hold generally: Model 7 shows that, if we omit both the assumption of a single
policy dimension and the assumption that the voting rule is oligarchic, then the status
quo may be in the core yet lie outside the social acceptance set.
This core selection result is related to the issue of core equivalence, addressed in
Banks and Duggan (2000). There, we show that, assuming perfectly patient legislators
(δ = 1), the stationary equilibrium outcomes coincide with the core when either the
policy space is unidimensional or the voting rule lies in a restricted class. That result
differs from fromTheorem 7 in several ways. First, the core equivalence result of Banks
and Duggan (2000) gives conditions under which every core policy can be supported as
an equilibrium outcome, whereas we are presently selecting just one core policy, namely,
the status quo. Second, the restriction on voting rules used for the multidimensional case
in that paper is somewhat weaker than requiringD be oligarchic.Third, that paper relies
on perfect patience, whereas we presently allow any discount factor. In fact, because of
the assumption of a bad status quo in that paper, core equivalence is impossible there
when the discount factor is strictly less than one. Lastly, our core selection result applies
only when the status quo is in the core, a condition that cannot hold in a model with a
bad status quo.
An easy implication of our core selection result in Theorem 7, with the continuity
result of Theorem 3, is the following comparative static on the status quo: as in Model 3,
when the status quo is close to the core, the proposals of the legislators will also be close
to the core in every no-delay stationary equilibrium. In other words, moderate status
quos lead to moderate equilibrium policy outcomes. Given a set Y ⊆ X and a policy x,
let d(Y, x) = sup{d(x, y) | y ∈ Y } measure the distance from Y to x, where d(x, y)
is the usual Euclidean distance. Thus, d(Ak, q) → 0 in the next theorem implies that
social acceptance sets collapse to a single core point.
Theorem 8 Assume that ρi > 0 for every legislator i ∈ N . Also assume that d = 1 andD
is proper or that D is oligarchic. Let qk → q ∈ K , and let {σ k} be a corresponding sequence
of no-delay stationary equilibria with social acceptance sets {Ak}. Then d(Ak, q) → 0.
By Theorems 5 and 6, we know that, unless the status quo is in the core, stationary
equilibrium proposals will not be concentrated on any one core point.As a consequence,
if q /∈ K and there is only one core point (as inModel 3), then some non-core policies are
necessarily proposed. The next result shows, however, that in many environments there
will always be at least one core policy proposed and passed with positive probability.This
gives us a weaker core selection result: in every stationary equilibrium, a core policy will
be realized with positive probability.
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Theorem 9 Assume that d = 1 and D is proper or that D is oligarchic. In every no-delay
stationary equilibrium σ , some legislator proposes a policy in the core, i.e., pi ∈ K for some
i ∈ N .
We saw no-delay stationary equilibria with non-core proposals in Model 3 when the
status quo was outside the core, i.e., q = x˜m. We also saw, however, that these proposals
converged to the core as the discount factor approached one. The next result establishes
this result as a general theorem, yielding an asymptotic core selection result as the
discount factor approaches one, regardless of the location of the status quo. The result
applies to very general voting rules when the policy space is unidimensional, and it holds
for a class containing the oligarchic rules when there are multiple issue dimensions. We
say a voting rule is collegial if there is at least one legislator who belongs to every decisive
coalition, i.e.,
⋂
C∈D C = ∅. This class includes all oligarchic voting rules, including
unanimity rule. Given sets Y,Z ⊆ X, we let D(Y,Z) = inf {d(Y, z) | z ∈ Z} measure
the distance from Y toZ.Thus, the convergence result stated next, thatD(Ak,K) → 0,
means that socially acceptable policies must be arbitrarily close to core policies as the
discount factor approaches one.
Theorem 10 Assume that ρi > 0 for every legislator i ∈ N . Also assume that d = 1 and
D is proper or that D is collegial. Let δk → 1, and let {σ k} be a corresponding sequence of
no-delay stationary equilibria with social acceptance sets {Ak}. Then D(Ak,K) → 0.
In other words, legislative patience necessarily leads to moderate equilibrium policy
outcomes. The implications of Theorem 10 are strongest when the core is a small set.
If the voting rule D is majority rule with an odd number of legislators, for example,
then the core consists of the unique median ideal point of the legislators, and in that case
the stationary equilibrium outcomes of our bargaining model approach the prediction
of the median voter theorem as legislators exhibit greater patience. Though we do not
model the elections that produce legislative policy-makers, this result has an interesting
implication for the design of electoral institutions: if we view legislator utility functions
as representative of their districts, and if we view the discount factor of a legislator
as corresponding to the probability of reelection, then systems that offer a sufﬁcient
incumbency advantage will lead to moderate policies.
CONCLUSION
This paper contributes a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo
is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining
models, the status quo is not assumed to be bad, and delay may be Pareto efﬁcient. And
in contrast to the social choice approach, where the existence of core policies in multiple
dimensions is a signiﬁcant problem, we prove existence of no-delay stationary equilibria
for any number of issue dimensions. We have investigated the conditions under which
delay is possible and found that, for the environments most interesting in policy-making
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applications, delay will almost never occur. Finally, we have given sufﬁcient conditions
for core selection, the event that stationary equilibrium outcomes always lie in the core,
and we have provided results on asymptotic core selection. Importantly, we have found
that moderate status quos lead to moderate policy outcomes, and legislative patience also
leads to moderation.While we have considered mainly foundational issues here, we have
proposed a general framework in which more substantive questions, about the nature of
public goods provided or the coalitions that form to pass proposals, for example, can be
taken up in special cases with more structure.
APPENDIX: TECHNICAL MATTERS
To deﬁne LSWP, we denote i’s weak and strict upper contour sets at x, respectively, by
Ri(x) = {y ∈ X | ui(y) ≥ ui(x)}
Pi(x) = {y ∈ X | ui(y) > ui(x)},
and we let
RC(x) =
⋂
i∈C
Ri(x) and R(x) =
⋃
C∈D
RC(x),
with similar conventions used forPC(x) andP(x).That is,RC(x) consists of the policies
that every member of C weakly prefers to x, and R(x) consists of the policies weakly
preferred to x by all members of some decisive coalition, with similar interpretations of
PC(x) and P(x). Given Y ⊆ X, let Y denote the closure of Y . Then limited shared weak
preference is satisﬁed if, for all C ⊆ N and all x ∈ X,
|RC(x)| > 1 implies RC(x) ⊆ PC(x).
That is, if y (distinct from x) is weakly preferred to x by all members of a coalition
C, then it can be approximated by policies that all members of C strictly prefer to x.
We have given sufﬁcient conditions for LSWP in the second Section. To see why strict
quasi-concavity implies LSWP, for example, suppose all members of coalition C weakly
prefer some policy y to x = y.Then every convex combination of x and y (with positive
weight on both) is strictly preferred to x by all members of C. Letting the weight on y
go to one, we approximate y by policies in PC(x), as required. Note that, with concavity,
LSWP implies strict quasi-concavity when d = 1.
The characterization of the core in unidimensional environments is well-known (cf.
Austen-Smith and Banks, 1999). Let x be the lowest ideal point, subject to the constraint
that the legislators to the right are not decisive, i.e., C1 = {i ∈ N | x˜i > x} /∈ D, and let
x be the greatest ideal point subject to the constraint that the legislators to the left are
not decisive, i.e., C2 = {i ∈ N | x˜i < x} /∈ D. Then K = [x, x], which is nonempty as
long as D is proper.
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Given a stationary strategy proﬁle σ , the probability measure ν is deﬁned as follows:
given measurable Y ⊆ X,
ν(Y ) =
∑
j∈N ρj [πj(Y ∩ A) + IY (q)(1 − δ)πj (X \ A)]
1 − δ∑
j∈N ρjπj (X \ A)
,
where IY (q) is the indicator function that takes value one if q ∈ Y and zero otherwise.
The continuation distribution, γ , is then deﬁned as γ (Y ) = (1− δ)µ(Y )+ δν(Y ), where
µ is the point mass on q.
Finally, in the following proofs, we refer to a subset G ⊆ X as open if it is open in the
relative topology, i.e., if there is an open subset G′ of d such that G = X ∩ G′.
Theorem 1 There exists a no-delay stationary equilibrium.
Proof: Toprove existence, letπ denote a proﬁle of mixed proposal strategies, and deﬁne
vi(π) =
∑
j∈N
ρj
∫
ui(z) πj (dz),
whichwould be i’s continuation value if eachπj put probability one on socially acceptable
proposals. Note that, since ui is continuous, vi(π) is continuous in the weak topology on
[P(X)]n. For all i ∈ N , deﬁne
Ai(π) = {x ∈ X | ui(x) ≥ (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(π)},
and, following our earlier conventions, let
AC(π) =
⋂
i∈C
Ai(π) and A(π) =
⋃
C∈D
AC(π).
Letting γ denote the continuation distribution corresponding to the stationary strategy
proﬁle σ = ((π1, A1(π)), . . . , (πn, An(π))), concavity implies x(γ ) =
∫
z dγ ∈ Ai(π)
for all i ∈ N . These sets are compact by compactness of X and continuity of ui , and
they are convex by convexity of X and concavity of ui . For all C ∈ D, AC(π) is also
nonempty, compact, and convex. And A(π) = ⋃
C∈D AC(π) is nonempty and compact,
but not necessarily convex. That A(π) is continuous as a correspondence follows from
the arguments in the proof of Theorem 7 in Banks and Duggan (2000). For all i ∈ N ,
deﬁne the optimal proposal correspondence,
Mi(π) = arg max{ui(x) | x ∈ A(π)},
constraining the proposer to A(π). By the Theorem of the Maximum (Aliprantis and
Border 1994,Theorem 14.30),Mi has nonempty and compact values and is upper hemi-
continuous. However, it is not necessarily convex-valued, since A(π) is not necessarily
convex. Let Bi(π) = P(Mi(π)) denote the set of mixtures of constrained optimal
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proposals for i, which deﬁnes a nonempty-, compact-, convex-valued, upper hemi-
continuous correspondence (Aliprantis and Border 1994, Theorem 14.14). Deﬁne the
correspondence B : [P(X)]n ⇒ [P(X)]n by
B(π) = B1(π) × · · · × Bn(π).
This correspondence is also nonempty-, compact-, convex-valued and upper hemicon-
tinuous (Aliprantis and Border 1994, Theorem 14.14). Since [P(X)]n is convex and
is compact in the weak topology, Glicksberg’s theorem (Aliprantis and Border 1994,
Corollary 14.50) yields a ﬁxed point of B, which we denote π ∗ = (π ∗1 , . . . , π ∗n ). We
claim that σ ∗ = ((π ∗1 , A1(π ∗)), . . . , (π ∗n , An(π ∗))) is a no-delay stationary equilibrium.
By construction, this proﬁle satisﬁes weak dominance and each π ∗
i
puts probability one
on i’s utility-maximizing policies in A(π ∗). We have left to check that a proposer i can-
not obtain a higher expected payoff by proposing a policy outside A(π ∗). That payoff
is (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ ∗). Letting γ ∗ denote the continuation distribution corre-
sponding to π ∗, concavity implies that payoff is less than or equal to ui(x(γ ∗)). Since
x(γ ∗) ∈ A(π ∗), we have sequential rationality, as required. 
Theorem 2 Assume either d = 1 or the voting rule D is oligarchic. Every no-delay
stationary equilibrium is in pure strategies.
Proof: First, assume that d = 1 and D is proper. Using the notation from the proof of
Theorem 1, we ﬁrst note thatA(π) is convex for all π .To see this, let x = maxA(π) and
x = minA(π), which exist by compactness of A(π), and letC andC satisfy x ∈ AC(π)
and x ∈ AC(π). Letting γ = ∑i∈N ρiπi , concavity implies x(γ ) ∈ [x, x] = convA(π).
By concavity, we have x(γ ) ∈ AC(π) ∩ AC(π). Take any y ∈ convA(π), and suppose
without loss of generality that y ∈ [x, x(γ )]. Since AC(π) is convex, by concavity, we
have y ∈ AC(π) ⊆ A(π), as required. If σ is a no-delay stationary equilibrium with
mixed proposal proﬁle, then it follows that A(π) is convex. By LSWP, each ui has a
unique ideal point in X, and then d = 1 and concavity yield strict quasi-concavity.
Thus, each ui has a unique maximizer in A(π), and πi must put probability one on that
policy.
Now assume D is oligarchic, with C = ⋂
C′∈D C
′. Let σ be any no-delay stationary
equilibrium. Then A(π) = AC(π). Take any i ∈ N , and suppose that distinct policies
x ′ and x ′′ solve max{ui(x) | x ∈ A(π)}. Letting γ denote the continuation distribution
corresponding to σ , note that concavity implies x(γ ) ∈ A(π) and, therefore, ui(x ′) =
ui(x
′′) ≥ ui(x(γ )) ≥ (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ ). Thus, x ′, x ′′ ∈ AC∪{i}(π). Let C ′ consist
of the members j of C ∪ {i} such that uj(x ′) > uj(x ′′), and let G be an open set around
x ′ such that, for all j ∈ C ′ and all y ∈ G, we have uj(y) > uj(x ′′). Since x ′′ ∈ Aj(π)
for all such j , this implies uj(y) > (1 − δ)uj (q) + δvj (σ ). Let C ′′ = (C ∪ {i}) \ C ′
consist of the members j of C ∪ {i} such that uj(x ′′) ≥ uj(x ′). Of course, i ∈ C ′′.
By LSWP and x ′ ∈ AC′′(π), there exists z ∈ X such that, for all j ∈ C ′′, we have
uj(z) > uj(x
′) ≥ (1 − δ)uj (q) + δvj (σ ). Choosing α ∈ (0, 1) small enough that
zα = (1 − α)x ′ + αx ′′ ∈ G, concavity implies that uj(zα) > (1 − δ)uj (q) + δvj (σ ) for
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all j ∈ C.Thus, zα ∈ A(π), and, since i ∈ C ′′, we have ui(zα) > ui(x ′), a contradiction.
Therefore, each ui has a unique maximizer in A(π), and πi must put probability one on
that policy. 
Letting  denote the unit simplex in n, deﬁne the correspondence E :  × X ×
[0, 1) ×  ⇒ [P(X)]n such that E(ρ, q, δ, λ) consists of the proﬁles of no-delay
stationary mixed proposal strategies for model parameters (ρ, q, δ, λ). We say that
E is upper hemicontinuous if, for every (ρ, q, δ, λ) and every open set Y ⊆ [P(X)]n
with E(ρ, q, δ, λ) ⊆ Y , there exists an open set Z ⊆  × X × [0, 1) ×  with
(ρ, q, δ, λ) ∈ Z such that, for all (ρ ′, q ′, δ′, λ′) ∈ Z, we have E(ρ ′, q ′, δ′, λ′) ⊆ Y .
Theorem 3 The correspondence E of no-delay stationary equilibria is upper hemicontin-
uous in the parameters of the model.
Proof: Given parameters ρ and λ, and given a proﬁle π of mixed proposal strategies,
deﬁne
vi(π, ρ, λ) =
∑
j∈N
∫
ui(z, λ) πj (dz)
for all i ∈ N . This would be i’s continuation value if each πj put probability one on
the social acceptance set. By continuity of ui and Billingsley’s (1968) Theorem 5.5, vi is
jointly continuous. Deﬁne
Ai(π, ρ, q, δ, λ) = {x ∈ X | ui(x) ≥ (1 − δ)ui(q, λ) + δvi(π, ρ, λ)}
and write AC(π, ρ, q, δ, λ) and A(π, ρ, q, δ, λ) using the usual conventions. Letting
γ = ∑
j∈N ρjπj , concavity implies x(γ ) ∈ Ai(π, ρ, q, δ, λ) for all i ∈ N , which
implies that the correspondence A has nonempty values. Continuity of A follows the
arguments in the proof of Theorem 7 in Banks and Duggan (2000). By the Theorem of
the Maximum, the correspondence Mi of constrained optimal proposals, deﬁned by
Mi(π, ρ, q, δ, λ) = arg max{ui(x) | x ∈ A(π, ρ, q, δ, λ)},
has nonempty and compact values and is upper hemicontinuous. It follows that the
correspondence Bi , deﬁned by Bi(π, ρ, q, δ, λ) = P(Mi(π, ρ, q, δ, λ)) also pos-
sesses these properties. Since Bi has closed values and regular range as well, it has
closed graph (Aliprantis and Border 1994, Theorem 14.11). Now, let (ρk, qk, δk, λk) →
(ρ◦, q◦, δ◦, λ◦), and take any sequence {πk} such that πk ∈ E(ρk, qk, δk, λk) for all k.
Suppose πk → π ◦. Since πk
i
∈ Bi(ρk, qk, δk, λk) for all k and since Bi has closed
graph, we see that π ◦
i
∈ Bi(ρ◦, q◦, δ◦, λ◦) for all i ∈ N . We claim that σ ◦, with
σ ◦
i
= (π ◦
i
, Ai(π
◦, ρ◦, q◦, δ◦, λ◦)) for all i ∈ N , is a no-delay stationary equilibrium.
Clearly, legislator acceptance sets satisfy weak dominance. If π ◦
i
does not satisfy sequen-
tial rationality, then i’s expected payoff from proposing a rejected policy exceeds the
payoff from π ◦
i
, i.e.,
(1 − δ◦)ui(q◦, λ◦) + δ◦vi(π ◦, ρ◦, λ◦) >
∫
ui(z) π
◦
i
(dz).
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Since these payoffs are jointly continuous, however, this strict inequality must hold for
high enough k, contradicting πk ∈ E(ρk, qk, δk, λk). Therefore, π ◦ ∈ E(ρ◦, q,◦ , δ◦,
λ◦), andwe conclude thatE has closed graph. Since it has compactHausdorff range space
as well, it is upper hemicontinuous (Aliprantis and Border 1994,Theorem 14.12). 
Theorem 4 Assume δ > 0, and assume that (i) there is a decisive coalition C all the
members of which have strictly concave utility functions, i.e., ui is strictly concave for all
i ∈ C, or that (ii) the sum of utilities∑
i∈N ui is strictly concave and limited transferability
is satisﬁed. Every stationary equilibrium is either no-delay or static.
Proof: Assume δ > 0. First, assume there exists C ∈ D such that, for all i ∈ C,
ui is strictly concave. Since δ < 1, the status quo has positive mass according to the
continuation distribution γ . If σ is not static, then, since δ > 0, γ is not concentrated
on q, so strict concavity implies
ui(x(γ )) > (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ ) (6)
for all i ∈ C. By continuity, there is an open set G around x(γ ) such that the inequality
(6) holds for all x ∈ G. Since C ∈ D, we then have G ⊆ A. Now consider any legislator
j ∈ N , and let x˜j be j ’s unique utility-maximizing policy. We claim that there exists
z ∈ G such that uj(z) > (1 − δ)uj (q) + δvj (σ ). This is clearly true if x˜j = x(γ ).
Otherwise, we have uj(x˜j ) > uj(x(γ )) ≥ (1− δ)uj (q)+ δvj (σ ), and the claim follows
from concavity by setting α ∈ (0, 1) small enough that z = (1 − α)x(γ ) + αx˜j ∈ G.
Therefore, by sequential rationality, we have πj(A) = 1, so that σ is no-delay.
Now assume that
∑
i∈N ui is strictly concave and that limited transferability is satisﬁed.
Since δ < 1, the status quohas positivemass according to the continuationdistributionγ .
If σ is not static, then, since δ > 0, γ is not concentrated on q, so strict concavity implies
∑
i∈N
ui(x(γ )) >
∑
i∈N
[(1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ )].
By concavity of each ui , it follows that there exists i ∈ N such that ui(x(γ )) >
(1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ ), and sequential rationality then implies that πi(A) = 1. Fur-
thermore, ui(x(γ )) > min{ui(y) | y ∈ X}. By limited transferability, there exists
z ∈ X such that, for all j = i, uj(z) > uj(x(γ )). Choose α ∈ (0, 1) small enough
that zα = (1 − α)x(γ ) + αz satisﬁes ui(zα) > (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ ). By concavity,
we have uj(zα) > uj(x(γ )) ≥ (1 − δ)uj (q) + δvj (σ ) for all j = i, so zα ∈ A, and
sequential rationality then implies πj(A) = 1 for all j = i. Thus, σ is no-delay, as
required. 
Theorem 5 Assume that at least two legislators have distinct ideal points. If σ is a no-delay
stationary equilibrium inwhich every legislator proposes the same policy, i.e., there existsx ∈ X
such that πi({x}) = 1 for all i ∈ N , then σ is static.
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Proof: Let σ be a no-delay stationary equilibrium for which there exists x ∈ X such
that, for all i ∈ N , πi({x}) = 1. Thus, the continuation distribution places probability
1 − δ on q and probability δ on x. If σ is not static, then x = q, and it follows that
x = x(γ ). Let C consist of the legislators i such that ui(x) ≥ (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ ),
i.e., x ∈ Ai . Since σ is no-delay, C ∈ D. Let C ′ consist of the members j of C such that
uj(x) > uj(x(γ )), and let G be any open set around x such that, for all j ∈ C ′ and all
y ∈ G, we have uj(y) > uj(x(γ )). By concavity, it follows that, for all j ∈ C ′ and all
y ∈ G, we also have uj(y) > (1 − δ)uj (q) + δvj (σ ). Let C ′′ = C \ C ′ consist of the
members j of C such that uj(x(γ )) ≥ uj(x). By LSWP, there exists z ∈ X such that,
for all j ∈ C ′′, we have uj(z) > uj(x). Then choosing α ∈ (0, 1) small enough that
zα = (1 − α)x + αz ∈ G, concavity implies uj(zα) > uj(x) ≥ (1 − δ)uj (q) + δvj (σ )
for all j ∈ C ′′. Therefore, uj(zα) > (1 − δ)uj (q) + δvj (σ ) for all j ∈ C, and, since
C ∈ D, weak dominance implies zα ∈ A. Suppose C ′′ = ∅, and take i ∈ C ′′. Then
ui(zα) > ui(x) and zα ∈ A contradict sequential rationality. Thus, C = C ′, and we
have ui(x) > (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ ) for all i ∈ C. Since C ∈ D, weak dominance
implies that x is in the interior of A. Now suppose that uj(y) > uj(x) for some j ∈ N
and y ∈ X. Then, for small enough β ∈ (0, 1), we have (1 − β)x + βy ∈ A, and, by
concavity, uj((1 − β)x + βy) > uj(x), contradicting sequential rationality. It follows
that x is maximal for every legislator i, but this contradicts our assumption that at least
two legislators have distinct ideal points. Therefore, σ is static. 
Theorem 6 Assume that every decisive coalition has positive recognition probability, i.e.,∑
i∈C ρi > 0 for all C ∈ D. There exists a static stationary equilibrium if and only if the
status quo is in the core, i.e., q ∈ K .
Proof: Let σ be a static stationary equilibrium, and suppose q /∈ K , i.e., there exist
C ∈ D and y ∈ X such that ui(y) > ui(q) = vi(σ ) for all i ∈ C. By weak dominance,
y ∈ AC ⊆ A. Then, for all i ∈ C, sequential rationality implies πi(A \ {q}) = 1.
But, because
∑
i∈C ρi > 0, this contradicts the assumption that σ is static. Now let
q ∈ K , and deﬁne σ by having each i ∈ N propose pi = q and accept Ai = Ri(q).
Since vi(σ ) = ui(q) for all i ∈ N , this proﬁle satisﬁes weak dominance. If sequential
rationality is violated, then there exist i ∈ N and y ∈ A such that ui(y) > ui(q). But
y ∈ A implies y ∈ AC for some C ∈ D, i.e., ui(y) ≥ ui(q) for all i ∈ C. By LSWP,
however, there exists z ∈ X such that ui(z) > ui(q) for all i ∈ C, contradicting q ∈ K .
Therefore, sequential rationality is satisﬁed, and σ is a stationary equilibrium. 
Corollary 2 Assume that δ > 0, that ρi > 0 for every legislator i ∈ N , and that D is
non-collegial. If the sum of utilities
∑
i∈N ui is strictly concave and limited transferability is
satisﬁed, then there are no stationary equilibria with delay.
Proof: From Theorems 4 and 6, it sufﬁces to show that the core is empty. Take any
x ∈ X. If ui(x) = min{ui(y) | y ∈ X} for all i ∈ N , then take any alternative
z ∈ X \ {x}, so that z ∈ RN(x). By LSWP, there exists z′ ∈ PN(x), i.e., ui(z′) > ui(z)
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for all i ∈ N . Since N ∈ D, this shows x /∈ K . If ui(x) > min{ui(y) | y ∈ X} for
some i ∈ N , then limited transferability yields a policy z ∈ X such that, for all j = i,
uj(z) > uj(x). SinceD is non-collegial, there existsC ∈ D such that i /∈ C.Therefore,
uj(z) > uj(x) for all j ∈ C, and it follows that x /∈ K . We conclude that K = ∅, as
required. 
Theorem 7 Assume that ρi > 0 for every legislator i ∈ N . Also assume that d = 1 and
D is proper or thatD is oligarchic. For every no-delay stationary equilibrium σ , the following
implications hold.
(i) A = {q} ⇔ (ii) q ∈ K ⇒ (iii) q ∈ A.
Moreover, if δ > 0, then (iii) ⇒ (ii).
Proof: Letσ be a no-delay stationary equilibrium.Note that (i) ⇒ (ii)holds generally.
Indeed, if A = {q}, then σ is static. That q ∈ K then follows from Theorem 6.
The remainder of the proof is divided into two parts corresponding to the two sets of
assumptions in the theorem.
First, assume d = 1 and D is proper. We begin by showing (ii) ⇒ (iii). Suppose
q ∈ K , denote the ideal points of the legislators by x˜i , and let x˜1 ≤ x˜2 ≤ · · · ≤ x˜n. Then
there exist m1,m2 ∈ N such that K = [x˜m1, x˜m2], C1 = {i ∈ N | i > m1} /∈ D, and
C2 = {i ∈ N | i < m2} /∈ D. Let A = [x, x]. If x = x, then all legislators propose the
same policy and, as long as some legislators have distinct ideal points,Theorem 5 implies
q ∈ A; if all legislators have the same ideal point, then q ∈ K implies that ideal point
is q, and again q ∈ A. So consider the case x < x, and suppose q /∈ A. In particular,
suppose q < x without loss of generality. Take any i ≤ m1, and note that x minimizes
ui over A. Since σ is no-delay, (2) implies that vi(σ ) ≥ ui(x). Furthermore, q ∈ K
implies ui(q) > ui(x), so we have ui(x) < (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ ), and then x /∈ Ai
by weak dominance. Therefore, the legislators who accept x are contained in C1, and it
follows that x /∈ A, a contradiction.Therefore, q ∈ A. We now suppose δ > 0 and show
(iii) ⇒ (i). From the above, this will imply (iii) ⇒ (ii), as in the theorem. Suppose
q ∈ A. Let x = minA and x = maxA, and let C,C ∈ D satisfy x ∈ AC and x ∈ AC .
Since D is proper, there exists i ∈ C ∩ C. Thus,
min{ui(x), ui(x)} ≥ (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ ) =
∫
ui(z) γ (dz).
Since σ is no-delay, γ (A ∪ {q}) = 1. Since q ∈ A, we have γ (A) = 1. Since ui is
concave, it attains its minimum over A at one of x or x, i.e.,
min{ui(x) | x ∈ A} = min{ui(x), ui(x)}.
Thus, γ must put probability one on i’s utility-minimizing socially acceptable proposals,
i.e.,
γ (arg min{ui(x) | x ∈ A}) = 1. (7)
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As in the proof of Theorem 2, A is convex, so (1/2)x + (1/2)x ∈ A. Then sequential
rationality implies
ui(pi) ≥ ui((1/2)x + (1/2)x) > min{ui(x), ui(x)} = min{ui(x) | x ∈ A},
where the strict inequality above follows from strict quasi-concavity. But this, δ > 0,
and ρi > 0, contradict (7). Therefore, x = x and A = {q}. Finally, we show (ii) ⇒ (i).
Suppose q ∈ K . From the above, A = {q} follows if δ > 0, so suppose δ = 0. Again let
x˜1 ≤ x˜2 ≤ · · · ≤ x˜n and K = [x˜m1, x˜m2], and consider any x < q. By weak dominance,
Ai = Ri(q), and, by concavity, the legislators who accept x therefore satisfy x˜i < q.
Thus, i accepts x only if x˜i < x˜m2 , and this coalition cannot be decisive. We conclude
that x /∈ A, and a similar argument holds for x > q, as required.
Now assume that D is oligarchic, and let C = ⋂
C′∈D C
′. If ui(q) ≥ vi(σ ) for
some i ∈ C, then we claim that q = pj for all j ∈ N . Since σ is no-delay and
ρj > 0 for all j ∈ N , we have pj ∈ A = AC for all j . Since i ∈ C, it follows that
ui(pj ) ≥ (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ ) for all j ∈ N . Then
vi(σ ) =
∑
j∈N
ρjui(pj ) ≥ (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ )
implies that vi(σ ) ≥ ui(q), so we have vi(σ ) = ui(q). Furthermore, pj ∈ Ai becomes
ui(pj ) ≥ ui(q), and then ρj > 0 for all j ∈ N and
vi(σ ) =
∑
j∈N
ρjui(pj ) ≥ ui(q) = vi(σ )
imply that ui(pj ) = ui(q) for all j ∈ N . If it is not the case that all legislators propose
q, then there exists j ∈ N such that pj = x(γ ). Let C ′ consist of the members h of
C such that uh(pj) > uh(x(γ )), and let G be an open set around pj such that, for all
h ∈ C ′ and all y ∈ G, we have uh(y) > uh(x(γ )). By concavity, for all h ∈ C ′ and
all y ∈ G, we also have uh(y) > (1 − δ)uh(q) + δvh(σ ). Let C ′′ = C \ C ′ consist of
the members h of C such that uh(x(γ )) ≥ uh(pj). Of course, i ∈ C. By LSWP, there
exists z ∈ X such that, for all h ∈ C ′′, we have uh(z) > uh(pj). Choosing α ∈ (0, 1)
small enough that zα = (1−α)pj +αz ∈ G, concavity implies that uh(zα) > uh(pj) ≥
(1 − δ)uh(q) + δvh(σ ) for all h ∈ C. Thus, uh(zα) ≥ (1 − δ)uh(q) + δvh(σ ) for all
h ∈ C. Since C ∈ D, this implies zα ∈ A. Then sequential rationality implies that
ui(pi) ≥ ui(zα) > ui(pj ) = ui(q),
where the strict inequality follows from i ∈ C, contradicting ui(pi) = ui(q).Therefore,
ui(q) ≥ vi(σ ) implies pj = q for all j ∈ N .
We now show (ii) ⇒ (iii). Suppose q ∈ K but q /∈ A. Then there exists j ∈ C such
that uj(q) < (1 − δ)uj (q) + δvj (σ ), so δ > 0 and, by concavity, uj(q) < uj(x(γ )).
Since q ∈ K , there exists i ∈ C such that ui(q) ≥ ui(x(γ )) ≥ (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ ),
and, since δ > 0, we have ui(q) ≥ vi(σ ). Thus, we have pj = q for all j ∈ N , but
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then x(γ ) = q, contradicting uj(q) < uj(x(γ )). Therefore, q ∈ A. We next show
(iii) ⇒ (i), assuming δ > 0. From the above, this will imply (iii) ⇒ (ii), as in
the theorem. If q ∈ A, then, for all i ∈ C, we have ui(q) ≥ (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ ).
Since δ > 0, this implies ui(q) ≥ vi(σ ), so again pj = q for all j ∈ N . Suppose
there exists x ∈ A with x = q. Then ui(x) ≥ (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ ) = ui(q) for
all i ∈ C. By LSWP, there exists z ∈ X such that ui(z) > ui(q) for all i ∈ C,
and therefore z ∈ A. Then sequential rationality implies that, for all i ∈ C, we have
ui(pi) ≥ ui(z) > ui(q) = ui(pi), a contradiction. Therefore, A = {q}. Finally, we
show (ii) ⇒ (i). Suppose q ∈ K . From the above, A = {q} follows if δ > 0, so let
δ = 0. Suppose there exists x ∈ A with x = q, so ui(x) ≥ ui(q) for all i ∈ C. But
then, by LSWP, there exists z ∈ X such that ui(z) > ui(q) for all i ∈ C, contradicting
q ∈ K . Therefore, A = {q}, as required. 
Theorem 8 Assume that d = 1 and D is proper or that D is oligarchic. In every no-delay
stationary equilibrium σ , some legislator proposes a policy in the core, i.e., pi ∈ K for some
i ∈ N .
Proof: First, assume d = 1 and D is proper. Let A = [x, x]. Denote the ideal points
of the legislators by x˜i , and let x˜1 ≤ x˜2 ≤ · · · ≤ x˜n. Since d = 1 and D is proper,
there exist m1,m2 ∈ N such that K = [x˜m1, x˜m2], C+1 = {i ∈ N | x˜i ≥ x˜m1} ∈ D, and
C+2 = {i ∈ N | x˜i ≤ x˜m2} ∈ D. If x˜m2 < x(γ ), then, for all i ∈ C2, we have
ui(x˜m2) ≥ ui(x(γ )) ≥ (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ ),
i.e., x˜m2 ∈ AC2 . SinceC2 ∈ D, we have x˜m2 ∈ A, and, by sequential rationality,pm2 = x˜m2 .
Similarly, if x(γ ) < x˜m1 , then x˜m1 ∈ A and pm1 = x˜m1 . If x˜m1 ≤ x(γ ) ≤ x˜m2 , then, since
x(γ ) ∈ A, we have A ∩ K = ∅. Then, by sequential rationality, pm1 = x˜m1 if it is in A
or pm1 = minA ∈ K otherwise.
Now assume D is oligarchic, with C = ⋂
C′∈D C
′, and consider i ∈ C and any
proposal pi ∈ A for legislator i. If pi /∈ K , then there exists x ∈ X such that,
for all j ∈ C, uj(x) > uj(pi). Since pi ∈ A, there exists C ′ ∈ D such that, for
all j ∈ C ′, uj(pi) ≥ (1 − δ)uj (q) + δuj (p). Since C ⊆ C ′, we have uj(x) >
(1 − δ)uj (q) + δuj (p) for all j ∈ C, which implies x ∈ A. But then ui(x) > ui(pi)
violates sequential rationality. Therefore, we must have pi ∈ K in every no-delay
equilibrium. 
Theorem 9 Assume that ρi > 0 for every legislator i ∈ N . Also assume that d = 1 and
D is proper or that D is collegial. Let δk → 1, and let {σ k} be a corresponding sequence of
no-delay stationary equilibria with social acceptance sets {Ak}. Then D(Ak,K) → 0.
Proof: In case D is collegial, specify i ∈ ⋂
C∈D C arbitrarily, so that A
k ⊆ Ak
i
for all k.
Since each σ k is no-delay, this implies that
πk
j
({x ∈ X | ui(x) ≥ (1 − δk)ui(q) + δkvi(σ k)}) = 1 (8)
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for every legislator j ∈ N and for all k. In case d = 1 and D is proper, let yk = minAk
and zk = maxAk for all k, and letCk, Ck ∈ D satisfy yk ∈ ACk and zk ∈ ACk . SinceD is
proper, there exists ik ∈ Ck ∩ Ck. Going to a subsequence if necessary, we may assume
that ik = i for all k. Thus, we have
min{ui(x) | x ∈ Ak} = min{ui(yk), ui(zk)} ≥ (1 − δk)ui(q) + δkvi(σ k)
for all k, where the ﬁrst equality uses convexity of Ak, established in the proof of
Theorem 2, and concavity of ui . Since πkj (A
k) = 1 for all j and k, we again have (8).
Thus, there exists a subsequence of {σ k} for which (8) holds for all j and all k. In the
next three paragraphs, we consider such a subsequence and deduce further properties
of it.
Deﬁne wk
i
(j) to be the expected payoff to legislator i when j is selected to propose in
the equilibrium σ k, i.e.,
wk
i
(j) =
∫
ui(x) π
k
j
(dx), (9)
and note that vi(σ k) = ∑j∈N ρjwki (j). Letting
k ∈ arg min{wk
i
(j) | j ∈ N} and hk ∈ arg max{wk
i
(j) | j ∈ N},
Equations 8 and 9 imply
wk
i
(k) ≥ (1 − δk)ui(q) + δkρhkwki (hk) + δk
∑
j =hk
ρjw
k
i
(j)
≥ (1 − δk)ui(q) + δkρhkwki (hk) + δk(1 − ρhk )wki (k),
which implies that
min
j∈N
wk
i
(j) ≥ max
j∈N
wk
i
(j) + 1 − δ
k
δkρhk
(ui(q) − wki (k)) (10)
for all k. Since P(X) is compact in the weak topology, the sequence {(πk1 , . . . , πkn )}
has a convergent subsequence (also indexed by k) with limit, say, (π1, . . . , πn). For all
j ∈ N , deﬁne wi(j) =
∫
uidπj . Since ui is continuous, weak convergence implies
wk
i
(j) → wi(j), and then (10) implies that wi(j) is independent of j , i.e., there exists
wi such thatwi(j) = wi for all j ∈ N . In general, for any legislator j , weak convergence
implies that the sequence {vj (σ k)} of continuation values converges to
vj = lim vj (σ k) =
∑
h∈N
ρh
∫
uj dπh, (11)
and for legislator i we have
vi = lim vi(σ k) = lim
∑
j∈N
ρjw
k
i
(j) = wi (12)
as well. Letting γ k be the continuation distribution corresponding to σ k, concavity
implies x(γ k) ∈ Ak
j
for all j and k, or in other words uj(x(γ k)) ≥ (1 − δk)uj (q) +
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δkvj (σ
k) for all j and k. Letting γ denote the limit of continuation distributions, which
is just
∑
j∈N ρjπj , weak convergence implies x(γ
k) → x(γ ), themean of the probability
measure γ , and then, by continuity, we have uj(x(γ )) ≥ vj for all j ∈ N .
We claim that, for all j ∈ N , πj is the point mass on x(γ ). If not, then there exists
an open set G around x(γ ), a legislator j , and a subsequence of {(πk1 , . . . , πkn )} (still
indexed by k) such that, for all k, we have πk
j
(X \G) > 0. Letting Sk denote the support
of πk
j
, this is equivalent to Sk \G = ∅ for all k.Thus, for each k, there exists xk ∈ Sk \G,
and going to a subsequence (still indexed by k) if needed, we assume that xk → x. For
all k, since σ k is no-delay, there exists Ck ∈ D such that xk ∈ Ak
C
. Note that i ∈ Ck
by (8). Again going to a subsequence (still indexed by k) if needed, we may assume that
Ck = C for all k, and of course i ∈ C. Thus, uh(xk) ≥ (1 − δk)uh(q) + δkvh(σ k) for all
h ∈ C. An implication of continuity and (11) is then that uh(x) ≥ vh for all h ∈ C. Let
C ′ consist of the members h of C such that uh(x) > uh(x(γ )), and letG′ be any open set
around x such that, for all h ∈ C ′ and all y ∈ G′, we have uh(y) > uh(x(γ )). It follows
that, for all h ∈ C ′ and all y ∈ G′, we also have uh(y) > vh. Let C ′′ = C \ C ′ consist
of the members h of C such that uh(x(γ )) ≥ uh(x). By LSWP, there exists z ∈ X such
that, for all h ∈ C ′′, we have uh(z) > uh(x). Then choosing α ∈ (0, 1) small enough
that zα = (1 − α)x + αz ∈ G′, concavity implies uh(zα) > uh(x) ≥ vh for all h ∈ C ′′.
Therefore,  = minh∈C(uh(zα) − vh) > 0, and by (11) we have
uh(zα) ≥ (1 − δk)uh(q) + δkvh(σ k) + 2
for all h ∈ C and for high enough k. Since C ∈ D, it follows from weak dominance that
zα ∈ Ak, and then, since i ∈ C, sequential rationality then implies that
wk
i
(i) ≥ (1 − δk)uh(q) + δkvi(σ k) + 2 .
But this inequality, with (12), yields
wi = limwki (i) ≥ lim vki +

2
= vi + 2 > wi,
a contradiction. Thus, each πk
j
indeed converges to the point mass on x(γ ).
We now claim that x(γ ) ∈ K . If not, then there exist y ∈ X and C ∈ D such that,
for all j ∈ C, we have uj(y) > uj(x(γ )). From the above argument, it follows that
vj = uj(x(γ )) for all j ∈ N , and so we have uj(y) > (1 − δk)uj (q) + δkvj (σ k) for all
j ∈ C and for high enough k. Thus, y ∈ Ak for high enough k. Let wk
j
(j) = ∫ ujπkj be
j ’s expected payoff when she proposes. This converges to uj(x(γ )), since πkj converges
to the point mass on x(γ ), and sequential rationality then implies wk
j
(j) ≥ uj(y) >
uj(x(γ )) = limwkj (j) for all j ∈ C and for high enough k, a contradiction. Thus, we
conclude that x(γ ) ∈ K .
Finally, if not D(Ak,K) → 0, then there must exist  > 0 and a subsequence
(also indexed by k) such that D(Ak,K) ≥  for all k. We have shown that there is a
further subsequence (also indexed by k) such that each πk
i
converges to the point mass
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on some x ∈ K . Then d(Ak, x) ≥  implies that there exist yk ∈ Ak and Ck ∈ D
such that d(yk, x) > /2 and yk ∈ Ak
Ck
. Going to a subsequence (still indexed by
k) if needed, we may assume Ck = C for all k and yk → y. Thus, we have ui(yk) ≥
(1−δk)ui(q)+ δkvi(σ k) for all i ∈ C and all k, and continuity then impliesui(y) ≥ ui(x)
for all i ∈ C. Since d(y, x) ≥ /2, we have y = x, and by LSWP, there exists
z ∈ X such that ui(z) > ui(x) for all i ∈ C. Thus, for high enough k, we have
ui(z) > (1− δk)ui(q)+ δkvi(σ k) for all i ∈ C, which implies z ∈ Ak for high enough k.
Sequential rationality then implies wk
i
(i) ≥ ui(z) > ui(x) = limwki (i) for high enough
k, a contradiction. Therefore, D(Ak,K) indeed converges to zero. 
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